We study the problem of state machine replication (SMR)-the underlying problem addressed by blockchain protocols-in the presence of a malicious adversary who can corrupt some fraction of the parties running the protocol. Existing protocols for this task assume either a synchronous network (where all messages are delivered within some known time ∆) or an asynchronous network (where messages can be delayed arbitrarily). Although protocols for the latter case give seemingly stronger guarantees, in fact they are incomparable since they (inherently) tolerate a lower fraction of corrupted parties.
work, show that these bounds are optimal in our setting. 1 While the high-level structure of our SMR protocol resembles the high-level structure of their BA protocol, in constructing our protocol we need to address several technical challenges (mainly due to the stronger liveness property required for SMR; see the following section) that do not arise in their work.
Related Work
There is extensive prior work on designing both Byzantine agreement and SMR/blockchain protocols; we do not provide an exhaustive survey, but instead focus only on the most relevant prior work.
As argued by Miller et al. [25] , many well-known SMR protocols that tolerate malicious faults (e.g., [7, 16] ) require at least partial synchrony in order to achieve liveness. Their HoneyBadger protocol [25] was designed specifically for asynchronous networks, but can only handle t < n/3 faults even if run in a synchronous network. Blockchain protocols are typically analyzed assuming synchrony [12, 26] ; Nakamoto consensus, in particular, assumes that messages will be delivered much faster than the time required to solve proof-of-work puzzles.
We emphasize that SMR is not realized by simply repeating a (multi-valued) BA protocol multiple times. In particular, the validity property of BA only guarantees that if a value is input by all honest parties then that value will be output by all honest parties. In the context of SMR the parties each hold multiple inputs in a local buffer (where those inputs may arrive at arbitrary times), and there is no way to ensure that all honest parties will select the same value as input to some execution of an underlying BA protocol. Although generic techniques for compiling a BA protocol into an SMR protocol are known [8] , those compilers are not network-agnostic and so do not suffice to solve our problem.
Our work focuses on protocols being run in a network that may be either synchronous or fully asynchronous. Other work looking at similar problems includes that of Malkhi et al. [24] , who consider networks that may be either synchronous or partially synchronous; Liu et al. [21] , who design a protocol that tolerates a minority of malicious faults in a synchronous network, and a minority of fail-stop faults in an asynchronous network; and Guo et al. [13] and Abraham et al. [2] , who consider temporary disconnections between two synchronous network components.
A slightly different line of work [22, 23, 27, 28] looks at designing protocols with good responsiveness. Roughly speaking, this means that the protocol still requires the network to be synchronous, but terminates more quickly if the actual message-delivery time is lower than the known upper bound ∆. Kursawe [17] designed a protocol for an asynchronous network that terminates more quickly if the network is synchronous, but does not tolerate more faults in the latter case.
Finally, other work [3, 9, 10, 29] considers a model where synchrony is available for some (known) limited period of time, but the network is asynchronous afterward.
Paper Organization
We define our model in Section 2, before giving definitions for the various tasks we consider in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe a network-agnostic protocol for the asynchronous common subset (ACS) problem. The ACS protocol is used as a subprotocol of our main result, the networkagnostic SMR protocol, which is described and analyzed in Section 5.
In Section 6 we prove a lower bound showing that the thresholds we achieve are tight for network-agnostic SMR protocols. As discussed above, Blum et al. [5] show an analogous result for BA that does not directly apply to our setting.
Model
Setup assumptions and notation. We consider a network of n parties P 1 , . . . , P n who communicate over point-to-point authenticated channels. We assume that the parties have established a public-key infrastructure prior to the protocol execution. That is, we assume that all parties hold the same vector (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) of public keys for a digital-signature scheme, and each honest party P i holds the honestly generated secret key sk i associated with pk i . A valid signature σ on m from P i is one for which Vrfy pk i (m, σ) = 1. For readability, we use m i to denote a tuple (i, m, σ) such that σ is a valid signature on message m signed using P i 's secret key.
For simplicity, we treat signatures as ideal (i.e., perfectly unforgeable); we also implicitly assume that parties use some form of domain separation when signing (e.g., by using unique session IDs) to ensure that signatures are valid only in the context in which they are generated.
Where applicable, we use κ to denote a statistical security parameter.
Adversarial model. We consider the security of our protocols in the presence of an adversary who can adaptively corrupt some number of parties. The adversary may coordinate the behavior of corrupted parties, and cause them to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. Note, however, that our claims about adaptive security are only with respect to the property-based definitions found in Section 3, not with respect to a simulation-based definition (cf. [11, 14] ).
Network model. We consider two possible settings for the network. In a synchronous network, all messages are delivered within some known time ∆ after they are sent, but the adversary can reorder and delay messages subject to this bound. (As a consequence, the adversary can potentially be rushing, i.e., it can wait to receive all incoming messages in a round before sending its own messages.) In this setting, we also assume all parties begin the protocol at the same time, and that parties' clocks progress at the same rate. When we say the network is asynchronous, we mean that the adversary can delay messages for an arbitrarily long period of time, though messages must eventually be delivered. We do not make any assumptions on parties' local clocks in the asynchronous case. The network is either synchronous or asynchronous for the duration of the protocol (although we stress that the honest parties do not know which is the case).
Definitions
Although we are ultimately interested in state machine replication, our main protocol relies on various subprotocols for different tasks. We therefore provide relevant definitions here.
Throughout, when we say that a protocol achieves some property, we mean that it achieves that property with overwhelming probability.
Useful Subprotocols
Throughout this section we consider protocols where, in some cases, parties may not terminate (even upon generating output); for this reason, we mention termination explicitly in the definitions. Honest parties are those who are not corrupted by the end of the execution.
Reliable broadcast. A reliable broadcast protocol allows parties to agree on a value chosen by a designated sender. In contrast to the stronger notion of broadcast, here honest parties might not terminate (but, if so, then none of them terminate).
Definition 1 (Reliable broadcast). Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n , where a designated party P * ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P n } begins holding input v * and parties terminate upon generating output.
-Validity: Π is t-valid if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if P * is honest, then every honest party outputs v * . -Consistency: Π is t-consistent if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: either no honest party outputs, or else all honest parties output the same value v ∈ {0, 1}.
If Π is t-valid and t-consistent, then we say it is t-secure.
Byzantine agreement. A Byzantine agreement protocol allows parties who each hold some initial value to agree on an output value. Note that for this definition we explicitly require termination.
Definition 2 (Byzantine agreement). Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n , where each party P i begins holding input v i ∈ {0, 1}.
-Validity: Π is t-valid if the following holds whenever at most t of the parties are corrupted: if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v, then every honest party outputs v. -Consistency: Π is t-consistent if the following holds whenever at most t of the parties are corrupted: every honest party outputs the same value v ∈ {0, 1}. -Termination: Π is t-terminating if whenever at most t of the parties are corrupted, every honest party terminates with some output in {0, 1} (with overwhelming probability).
If Π is t-valid, t-consistent, and t-terminating, then we say it is t-secure.
Asynchronous common subset (ACS). Informally, a protocol for the asynchronous common subset (ACS) problem allows n parties, each with some input, to agree on a subset of those inputs. (The term "asynchronous" in the name is historical, and one can also consider protocols for this task in the synchronous setting.)
Definition 3 (ACS). Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n , where each P i begins holding input v i ∈ {0, 1} * , and parties output sets of size at most n.
-Validity: Π is t-valid if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v, then every honest party outputs {v}. if an honest party outputs a set S, then S contains the inputs of at least t + 1 honest parties.
State Machine Replication
Protocols for state machine replication (SMR) allow parties to maintain agreement on an evergrowing, ordered sequence of blocks, where a block is a set of values called transactions. An SMR protocol does not terminate but instead continues indefinitely. We model the sequence of blocks output by a party P i via a write-once array Blocks i = Blocks i [0], Blocks i [1] , . . . maintained by P i , each entry (or slot) of which is initially equal to ⊥. We say that P i outputs a block in slot j when P i writes a block to Blocks i [j]; if Blocks i [j] =⊥ then we refer to Blocks i [j] as the block output by P i in slot j. We do not require that honest parties output a block in slot j − 1 before outputting a block in slot j. It is useful to define a notion of epochs for each party. (We stress that these are not global epochs; instead, each party maintains a local view of its current epoch.) Formally, we assume that each party P i maintains a write-once array Epochs i = Epochs i [0], Epochs i [1] , . . ., each entry of which is initialized to 0. We say P i enters epoch j when it sets Epochs i [j] := 1, and require:
-For j > 0, P i enters epoch j − 1 before entering epoch j.
-P i enters epoch j before outputting a block in slot j.
An SMR protocol is run in a setting where parties asynchronously receive inputs (i.e., transactions) as the protocol is being executed; each party P i stores transactions it receives in a local buffer buf i . We imagine these transactions as being provided to parties by some mechanism external to the protocol (which could involve a gossip protocol run among the parties themselves), and make no assumptions about the arrival times of these transactions at any of the parties.
We remark that according to these rules, P i may output a block for slot j before it outputs a block for slot j − 1, but it enters epoch j after entering epoch j − 1. If it is required for the application of the SMR protocol that parties output blocks in sequence, this is easily achievable by instructing parties to hold a block for slot j without outputting until all blocks up to and including block j − 1 have been output. 2 Definition 4 (State machine replication). Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n who are provided with transactions as input and locally maintain arrays Blocks and Epochs as described above.
-Consistency: Π is t-consistent if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: for all j, if an honest party outputs a block B in slot j then all parties that remain honest output B in slot j. -Strong liveness: Π is t-live if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: for any transaction tx for which every honest party received tx before entering epoch j, every party that remains honest outputs a block that contains tx in some slot j ′ ≤ j . -Completeness: Π is t-complete if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted:
for all j ≥ 0, every party that remains honest outputs some block in slot j.
If Π is t-consistent, t-live, and t-complete, then we say it is t-secure. 2 More formally, let Π denote the underlying SMR protocol that outputs blocks out of order. We can construct an SMR protocol Π ′ that outputs blocks in order by simply buffering the blocks output by Π and outputting the next block i whenever all the blocks up to i − 1 have already been output. Π ′ inherits strong liveness from strong liveness and completeness of Π.
Our liveness definition is stronger than usual, in that we require a transaction tx that appears in all honest parties' buffers by epoch j to be included in a block output by each honest party in some slot j ′ ≤ j. (Typically, liveness only requires that each honest party eventually outputs a block containing tx.) This stronger notion of liveness is useful for showing that SMR implies Byzantine agreement (see Section A.2) and is achieved by our protocol.
In our definition, a transaction tx is only guaranteed to be contained in a block output by an honest party if all honest parties receive tx as input. A stronger definition would be to require this to hold even if only a single honest party receives tx as input. It is easy to achieve the latter from the former, however, by simply having honest parties gossip all transactions they receive to the rest of the network.
An ACS Protocol with Higher Validity Threshold
Throughout this section, we assume an asynchronous network.
The asynchronous common subset (ACS) problem was originally introduced by Ben-Or et al. [4] . In this section, we construct an ACS protocol that is secure when the number of corrupted parties is below one threshold, and continues to provide validity even for some higher corruption threshold. That is, fix t a ≤ t s with t a + 2 · t s < n. We show an ACS protocol that is t a -secure, and achieves validity even for t s corruptions. This protocol will be a key ingredient in our SMR protocol.
Our construction follows the high-level approach taken by Miller et al. [25] , who devise an ACS protocol based on subprotocols for reliable broadcast and Byzantine agreement. In our case we need a reliable broadcast protocol that achieves validity for t s ≥ n/3 faults, and in Section 4.1 we show such a protocol. We then describe and analyze our ACS protocol in Section 4.2.
Reliable Broadcast with Higher Validity
In Figure 1 , we present a variant of Bracha's (asynchronous) reliable broadcast protocol [6] that allows for a more general tradeoff between consistency and validity. Specifically, the protocol is parameterized by a threshold t s ; for any t a ≤ t s with t a + 2 · t s < n, the protocol achieves t aconsistency and t s -validity.
Protocol Π ts
BB
The sender P * sends its input v * to all parties. Then each party does:
was not yet sent, then send (ready, v * ) to all parties. -Upon receiving (ready, v * ) messages on the same value v * from ts + 1 distinct parties, do: if (ready, v * )
was not yet sent, then send (ready, v * ) to all parties. -Upon receiving (ready, v * ) messages on the same value v * from n − ts distinct parties, output v * and terminate. 
Proof. Assume there are at most t s corrupted parties, and the sender is honest. All honest parties receive the same value v * from the sender, and consequently send (echo, v * ) to all other parties.
Since there are at least n − t s honest parties, all honest parties receive (echo, v * ) from at least n − t s different parties, and as a result send (ready, v * ) to all other parties. By the same argument, all honest parties receive (ready, v * ) from at least n − t s parties, and so can output v * (and terminate).
To complete the proof, we also argue that honest parties cannot output v = v * . Note first that no honest party will send (echo, v) for any v = v * . Thus, any honest party will receive (echo, v) for some v = v * from at most t s other parties. Since t s < n−t s , no honest party will ever send (ready, v) for any v = v * . By the same argument, this shows that honest parties will receive (ready, v) for some v = v * from at most t s other parties, and hence cannot output v = v * . Lemma 2. Let t a be such that t a ≤ t s and t a + 2 · t s < n. Then Π ts BB is t a -consistent. Proof. Suppose at most t a parties are corrupted, and that an honest party P i outputs v. Then P i must have received (ready, v) messages from at least n−t s distinct parties, at least n−t s −t a ≥ t s +1 of whom are honest. Thus, all honest parties receive (ready, v) messages from at least t s + 1 distinct parties, and so all honest parties send (ready, v) messages to everyone. It follows that all honest parties receive (ready, v) messages from at least n − t a ≥ n − t s parties, and so can output v as well.
To complete the proof, we argue that honest parties cannot output v ′ = v. We argued above that all honest parties send (ready, v) to everyone. Let P be the first honest party to do so. Since t a < t s + 1, that party must have sent (ready, v) in response to receiving (echo, v) messages from at least n − t s distinct parties. If some honest P j outputs v ′ then, arguing similarly, some honest party P ′ must have received (echo, v ′ ) messages from at least n − t s distinct parties. But this is a contradiction, since honest parties send only a single echo message but 2 · (n − t s ) − t a > n.
An ACS Protocol
In Figure 2 we describe an ACS protocol Π ts,ta ACS that is parameterized by thresholds t s , t a , where t a ≤ t s and t a + 2 · t s < n. Our protocol relies on two subprotocols: a reliable broadcast protocol Bcast that is t s -valid and t a -consistent (such as the protocol Π ts BB from the previous section), and a Byzantine agreement protocol BA that is t a -secure. (Since t a < n/3, any asynchronous BA protocol secure for that threshold can be used.) Our ACS protocol runs several executions of these protocols as sub-routines, and so to distinguish between them we denote the ith execution by Bcast i , resp., BA i . We say that the executions Bcast i , BA i correspond to party P i .
As we will see in the analysis below, Π ts,ta ACS is only t a -live, not terminating (and in fact runs forever). Given that the SMR protocol itself runs indefinitely, it is reasonable to settle for an Π ts,ta ACS protocol that runs forever but has bounded communication complexity; we prove that Π ts,ta ACS has bounded communication complexity in Lemma 8 below. Likewise, the state for Π ts,ta ACS may not be bounded, but since the state for Π ts,ta SMR is also unbounded, we consider this acceptable. Lemma 3. Say t s < n/2 and at most t s parties are corrupted. Then if an honest P i uses input v i in an execution of Π ts,ta ACS , all honest parties receive output v i from Bcast i . Proof. The lemma follows from t s -validity of Bcast.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we note that because BA is t a -secure even when the network is asynchronous, it remains t a -consistent and t a -valid even once honest parties cease to participate because C 1 is true. In proving the following lemmas, we implicitly rely on this fact. 
After outputting:
-Continue to participate in any ongoing Bcast executions.
-Once C1 = true, stop participating in any ongoing BA executions. Lemma 4. If t a + 2 · t s < n, then Π ts,ta ACS is t s -valid.
Proof. Note that t s < n/2. Say at most t s parties are dishonest, and all honest parties have the same input v. Using Lemma 3, we see that at least n − t s executions of {Bcast i } (namely, those for which P i is honest) will result in v as output, and so all honest parties can take Exit 1 and output {v}. It is not possible for an honest party to take Exit 1 and output something other than {v}, since t s < n − t s . Thus, it only remains to show that if an honest party takes some other exit then it must also output {v}. Consider the two possibilities:
Exit 2: Suppose some honest party P takes Exit 2 and outputs {v ′ }. Then, for that party, C 2 (v ′ ) is true, and so P must have seen at least ⌊ s 2 ⌋ + 1 of the {Bcast i } i∈S * terminate with output v ′ . Moreover, P must have ready = true and so s ≥ n − t a . Together, these imply that P has seen at least
At least one of those executions must correspond to an honest party. But then Lemma 3 implies that v ′ = v.
Exit 3: Assume an honest party P takes Exit 3. Then P must have ready = true (and so s ≥ n − t a ), must have seen all executions {BA i } i∈[n] terminate, and must also have seen all executions
a majority of the executions {Bcast i } i∈S * that P has seen terminate must correspond to honest parties. Lemma 3 implies that all those executions must have resulted in output v. But then C 2 (v) must be true for P , and it would not have taken Exit 3.
The following two lemmas prove that Π ts,ta ACS is t a -consistent and t a -live. First, we show that if two honest parties each output a set, then those sets are equal. Then we show that all honest parties do indeed output a set.
Lemma 5. Fix t a , t s with t a ≤ t s and t a + 2 · t s < n, and assume at most t a parties are corrupted. Then if honest parties P 1 and P 2 output sets S 1 and S 2 , respectively, in an execution of Π ts,ta ACS , it holds that S 1 = S 2 .
Proof. We consider different cases based on the possible exits taken by the two honest parties, and show that in all cases their outputs agree.
Case 1: Either P 1 or P 2 takes Exit 1. Say P 1 takes Exit 1 and outputs {v 1 }. (The case where P 2 takes Exit 1 is symmetric.) We consider different sub-cases:
-P 2 takes Exit 1: Say P 2 outputs {v 2 }. Then P 1 and P 2 must have each seen at least n − t s executions of {Bcast i } output v 1 and v 2 , respectively. Since t s < n/2, at least one of those executions must be the same. But then t a -consistency of Bcast implies that v 1 = v 2 . -P 2 takes Exit 2: Say P 2 outputs {v 2 }. For C 2 (v 2 ) to be satisfied, P 2 must have s ≥ n − t a , and must have seen at least
As above, P 1 must have seen at least n − t s executions of
at least one of those executions must be the same and so t a -consistency of Bcast implies that v 1 = v 2 . -P 2 takes Exit 3: We claim this cannot occur. Indeed, if P 2 takes Exit 3 then P 2 must have ready = true (and so s ≥ n − t a ), and must have seen all executions {BA i } i∈[n] terminate and all executions {Bcast i } i∈S * terminate. Because P 1 took Exit 1, P 1 must have seen at least n − t s executions {Bcast i } i∈[n] output v 1 , and therefore (by t a -consistency of Bcast) there are at most t s executions {Bcast i } i∈[n] that P 2 has seen terminate with a value other than v 1 . The number of executions of {Bcast i } i∈S * that P 2 has seen terminate with output v 1 is therefore at least (n − t a ) − t s > t s , which is strictly greater than the number of executions {Bcast i } i∈S * that P 2 has seen terminate with a value other than v 1 . But then C 2 (v 1 ) is true for P 2 , and it would not take Exit 3.
Case 2:
Neither P 1 nor P 2 takes Exit 1. We consider two sub-cases:
-P 1 and P 2 both take Exit 2. Say P 1 outputs {v 1 } and P 2 outputs {v 2 }. Both P 1 and P 2 must have seen all {BA i } terminate; by t a -consistency of BA they must therefore hold the same S * . Since C 2 (v 1 ) holds for P 1 , it must have seen a majority of the executions {Bcast i } i∈S * output v 1 ; similarly, P 2 must have seen a majority of the executions {Bcast i } i∈S * output v 2 . Then t aconsistency of Bcast implies v 1 = v 2 .
-Either P 1 or P 2 takes Exit 3. Say P 1 takes Exit 3. (The case where P 2 takes Exit 3 is symmetric.) As above, P 1 and P 2 agree on S * (this holds regardless of whether P 2 takes Exit 2 or Exit 3). Since C 3 holds for P 1 but C 2 does not, P 1 must have seen all executions {Bcast i } i∈S * terminate but without any value being output by a majority of those executions. But then t a -consistency of Bcast implies that P 2 also does not see any value being output by a majority of those executions, and so will not take Exit 2. Since P 2 instead must take Exit 3, it must have seen all executions {Bcast i } i∈S * terminate; t a -consistency of Bcast then implies that P 2 outputs the same set as P 1 .
Lemma 6. Fix t a , t s with t a ≤ t s and t a + 2 · t s < n. Then Π ts,ta ACS has t a -set quality.
Proof. Consider some honest party P . We again consider the various possibilities. Say P takes Exit 1 and outputs S = {v}. Then P has seen at least n − t s executions {Bcast i } terminate with output v. Of these, at least n − t s − t a > t s ≥ t a must correspond to honest parties. By Lemma 3, those honest parties all had input v. This means that S contains the inputs of at least t a + 1 honest parties. Alternatively, say P takes Exit 2 or Exit 3 and outputs a set S. Then P holds ready = true, and so |S * | ≥ n − t a . At least n − 2 · t a > max{(n − t a )/2, t a } of the indices in S * correspond to honest parties, and by Lemma 3 for each of those parties the corresponding output value v ′ i that P holds is equal to that party's input. Thus, regardless of whether P takes Exit 2 (and S contains the majority value output by {Bcast i } i∈S * ) or Exit 3 (and S contains every value output by {Bcast i } i∈S * ), the set S output by P contains the inputs of at least t a + 1 honest parties. Lemma 7. Fix t a , t s with t a ≤ t s and t a + 2 · t s < n. Then Π ts,ta ACS is t a -live.
Proof. Assume at most t a parties are corrupted during an execution of Π ts,ta ACS . We consider two cases: either some honest party takes Exit 1 during this execution, or no honest party ever takes Exit 1 during this execution. In the first case, the first honest party to take Exit 1 must have seen at least n − t s executions {Bcast i } i∈[n] output with the same value v. Hence, t a -consistency of Bcast implies that all other honest parties will eventually see at least those n − t s executions output v, and will output (if they have not already output via another exit).
In the second case, no honest party ever takes Exit 1. We argue that eventually all honest parties will set ready = true and output. If no honest party ever takes Exit 1, then all honest parties continue to participate in any still-running BA executions indefinitely. At all times t ′ such that no honest party has yet set ready = true, for all {BA i } i∈[n] , each honest party has either input 1 or not yet provided input. Such executions are indistinguishable from an execution in which all honest parties have input 1, but some messages have been delayed, and therefore t a -validity of BA implies that (so long as no honest parties input 0) these executions eventually output 1. There are now two possibilities: either it continues to be true that no honest parties input 0 to any BA execution, or some honest party inputs 0 to some BA execution. In the first case, t a -validity of BA implies that at least n − t a executions eventually output 1 for all honest parties, and therefore all honest parties set ready = true. In the latter case, some honest party must have already set ready = true as a result of seeing at least n − t a BA executions output 1. Therefore, by t a -consistency of BA, all honest parties will eventually see at least n − t a BA executions output 1, and therefore all honest parties set ready = true. Once ready = true, each honest party will output as soon as all {Bcast i } i∈S * output. Each Bcast i such that i ∈ S * is guaranteed to eventually output for the following reason: either the sender is honest, and Bcast i terminates by Lemma 3, or the sender is dishonest, but by t a -validity of BA, at least one honest party must have input 1 to BA i as a result of seeing Bcast i terminate, and therefore eventually everyone sees Bcast i terminate due to t a -consistency of Bcast. Lemma 8. Fix t a , t s with t a ≤ t s and t a + 2 · t s < n. Then Π ts,ta ACS has bounded communication complexity under both of the following conditions:
1. At most t a parties are corrupted. 2. At most t s parties are corrupted and all honest parties input the same value v.
Proof. Because Bcast has bounded communication complexity, it remains to show that all honest parties eventually stop participating in all BA executions, either because they terminate or because they set C 1 = true and stop participating in any still-running executions. We consider each condition separately.
Case 1: At most t a parties are corrupted. We must show that either all BA executions will eventually terminate, or all honest parties eventually set C 1 = true and stop participating in any still-running BA executions.
Assume no honest parties take Exit 1 during an execution of BA. Then all honest parties continue to participate in all BA executions, and so bounded complexity follows from t a -termination of BA.
Now assume some party takes Exit 1 during an execution of Π ts,ta ACS . That party must have seen at least n − t s executions {Bcast i } i∈[n] output with the same value. By t a -consistency of Bcast, all honest parties eventually see those executions output with the same value, and thus can set C 1 = true and stop participating in any still-running BA executions.
Case 2: At most t s parties are corrupted and all honest parties input the same value v. Because all honest parties input the same value v, t s -validity of Bcast implies that all honest parties will eventually set C 1 = true and thus stop participating in any still-running BA executions. Theorem 1. Fix t a , t s with t a ≤ t s and t a + 2 · t s < n. Then Π ts,ta ACS is t a -secure and t s -valid. Proof. Lemmas 5 and 7 together prove t a -consistency. The theorem follows Lemmas 4 and 6.
A Network-Agnostic SMR Protocol
In this section, we show our main result: an SMR protocol that is t s -secure in a synchronous network and t a -secure in an asynchronous network. We begin in Section 5.1 by briefly introducing a useful subprotocol for what we call block agreement. (We defer a more detailed explanation of this protocol, along with relevant proofs, to the appendix.) We then use the block agreement protocol to construct an SMR protocol in Section 5.2.
Block Agreement
Recall that m i is shorthand for (i, m, σ), where σ is a valid signature by P i on message m.
We define here a notion we call block agreement, and show a block-agreement protocol secure against any t < n/2 corrupted parties. The structure of our protocol is inspired by the synod protocol of Abraham et al. [1] . Block agreement is a form of agreement where (1) in addition to an input, parties provide signatures (in a particular format) on those inputs, and (2) a stronger notion of validity is required. Specifically, consider pairs consisting of a block B along with a set Σ of signed buffers buf j j . We say a pair (B, Σ) is valid if: -Σ contains signed buffers from strictly more than n/2 distinct parties.
-For each buf j j ∈ Σ, buf j ⊆ B. (Note each buffer can be represented as a bit-vector of length |B|.)
Definition 5 (Block agreement). Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n , where each party P i begins holding input (B i , Σ i ) and parties terminate upon generating output.
-Validity: Π is t-valid if whenever at most t of the parties are corrupted, then every honest party that outputs, outputs a t-valid pair. If Π is t-valid, t-consistent, and t-terminating, then we say it is t-secure.
There exists a block agreement protocol Π ts BLA that is t-secure for any t < n/2 when run in a synchronous network. Moreover, in a synchronous network, all honest parties terminate with probability 1 − 2 −κ after time 5∆κ.
We now proceed directly to the SMR construction, deferring the block agreement construction and corresponding security proof until the Appendix.
State Machine Replication
At a high level, the protocol proceeds as follows. The parties attempt to achieve agreement on a block for each slot j using the block agreement protocol Π ts BLA . If that protocol succeeds in reaching agreement, parties use its output B as input to the ACS protocol Π ts,ta ACS from the previous section. Recall from Theorem 2 that Π ts BLA terminates after time 5∆κ with overwhelming probability when run in a synchronous network; this ensures that if the network is synchronous and at most t s parties are corrupted, then all parties agree on their input B to Π ts,ta ACS . Hence, t s -validity of Π ts,ta ACS ensures that all parties output B. On the other hand, if Π ts BLA fails to output within time 5∆κ, parties abandon it and instead attempt to reach agreement using the ACS protocol directly. Now, t a -consistency and set quality of the ACS protocol ensure agreement (for at most t a corruptions) even if the network happens to be asynchronous.
In our protocol for state machine replication, parties agree on an ordered sequence of blocks. The data included in each block is determined by the output of the ACS subprotocol. Parties begin agreement on each new block at regular intervals (thanks to their synchronized clocks). All parties begin each iteration at the same time as long as the network is synchronous, though different parties may finish each block at different times, and indeed some parties may continue participating in an earlier iteration while at the same time beginning to participate in a new iteration. On the other hand, if the network is asynchronous, parties might not start iterations at the same time and the protocol must continue to ensure secure progress. In the following, we show how this can be achieved by relying on the network-agnostic properties of Π ts,ta ACS .
Theorem 3 (Consistency). Fix t a , t s with t a < n/3 and t a + 2 · t s < n. The following guarantee holds for any execution of Π ts,ta SMR for which either (1) at most t s parties are dishonest and the network Protocol Π ts,ta
SMR
We describe the protocol from the point of view of a party Pi.
To agree on Blocksi[k], execute the following steps, starting at time T k := (∆ + 5∆κ)(k − 1): Proof. We consider two cases. In the first, at most t s parties are dishonest and the network is synchronous, in the second, at most t a parties are dishonest and the network is asynchronous. Case 1. In this case, by Theorem 2, all parties receive output (B, Σ) from the block-agreement subprotocol after time at most 5∆κ, and furthermore, (B, Σ) must be t s -valid. By t s -validity of Π ts ACS (Lemma 4), any two honest parties P i and P j receive output BlockSet = {B} from Π ts ACS . Therefore, both parties set Blocks i [k] = Blocks j [k] = B and terminate the subprotocol for slot k.
Set Epochs
Case 2. In this case, by t a -consistency of Π ts ACS , we have that all honest parties agree on the same set BlockSet. Hence, everybody outputs the same block for slot k and therefore in particular,
Theorem 4 (Strong liveness). Fix t a , t s with t a < n/3 and t a + 2 · t s < n. The following guarantee holds for any execution of Π ts,ta SMR for which either (1) at most t s parties are dishonest and the network is synchronous, or (2) at most t a parties are dishonest and the network is asynchronous: If a transaction tx has been received by every honest party before entering epoch k, then for every honest party P i , tx ∈ Blocks i [k ′ ] such that k ′ ≤ k.
Proof. We consider two cases. In the first, at most t s parties are dishonest and the network is synchronous, in the second, at most t a parties are dishonest and the network is asynchronous. Note that in either case, all parties eventually hold a set B of size t s + 1, since there are at most n − t s > t a + t s > t s corruptions in either case (since t a ≤ t s ). Case 1. In this case, by consistency and validity of Π ts BLA , all parties receive output (B, Σ) from the block-agreement subprotocol after time at most 5κ∆, and furthermore, (B, Σ) must be t s -valid. By t s -validity of Π ts,ta ACS (Lemma 4), all parties receive output {B} from the ACS subprotocol and hence output {B} as the block for slot k . Since (B, Σ) is t s -valid, it includes all the transactions held in some honest party P j 's buffer at the point in time that it entered epoch k. Hence, either tx was in P j 's buffer (and so B includes tx), or tx was not in P j 's buffer, which implies that P j has already output a block Blocks j [k ′ ] such that k ′ < k and tx ∈ Blocks j [k ′ ] (and so by Theorem 3, all other honest parties eventually output that same block). Case 2. In this case, note that honest parties only supply B * such that either (B * , Σ) or (B * , Σ ′ ) is t s -valid as input to Π ts,ta ACS (since they input either B or B ′ ). By t a -consistency and t a -set quality of Π ts,ta ACS , we have that all parties agree on a set BlockSet containing at least t a + 1 honest blocks. In particular, all of these honest blocks contain the buffer buf of an honest party P j at the point it time that it entered epoch k. Hence, either tx was in P j 's buffer (and soB ∈ BlockSet includes tx), or tx was not in P j 's buffer, which implies that P j has already output a block Blocks j [k ′ ] such that k ′ < k and tx ∈ Blocks j [k] (and so by Theorem 3, all other honest parties eventually output that same block). In either case, there exists an epoch k ′ ≤ k such that all honest blocks in BlockSet include tx, and it immediately follows that the union of blocks in BlockSet also contains tx.
Theorem 5 (Completeness). Fix t a , t s with t a < n/3 and t a + 2·t s < n. The following guarantee holds for any execution of Π ts,ta SMR for which either (1) at most t s parties are dishonest and the network is synchronous, or (2) at most t a parties are dishonest and the network is asynchronous: for all k, any honest party P i eventually outputs a block Blocks i [k] for slot k.
Proof. Regardless of whether the protocol is run in a synchronous network with at most t s corruptions, or in an asynchronous network with at most t a corruptions, the lemma follows by the liveness and termination properties of the subprotocols used.
Optimality of Our Thresholds
In this section we show that the parameters achieved by our protocol are optimal. This extends the analogous result by Blum et al. [5] , who consider only the case of Byzantine agreement. We remark that, although SMR is generally thought of as a stronger form of consensus than BA, it is unclear whether a bound on the number of tolerable corruptions for BA implies one for SMR (under the same network conditions). For example, the folklore result that SMR implies BA only holds given less than n/3 corruptions. Because of this, impossibility of BA for n/3 corruptions does not imply impossibility of SMR under n/3 corruptions, and hence must be proven separately. Similarly to the above example, the bound of [5] does not imply ours. Lemma 9. Fix t a , t s , n with t a + 2t s ≥ n. If an n-party SMR agreement protocol Π is t s -strongly live in a synchronous network, then it cannot also be t a -consistent in an asynchronous network.
Proof. Assume t a + 2t s = n and fix an SMR protocol Π. Partition the n parties into sets S 0 , S 1 , S a where |S 0 | = |S 1 | = t s and |S a | = t a , and consider the following experiment: Next consider an execution of Π in an asynchronous network where parties in S a are corrupted, and run Π honestly with S 0 where all parties initially hold m 0 in their buffers at the start of the execution of Π. Simultaneously, they run Π honestly with S 1 where all parties initially hold m 1 in their buffers at the start of the execution of Π. Moreover, in this execution, all communication between the (honest) parties in S 0 and S 1 is delayed indefinitely. The views of the honest parties in this execution are distributed identically to the views of S 0 ∪ S 1 in the above experiment, yet the conclusion of the preceding paragraph shows that t a -consistency is violated with high probability, since a party in S 1 includes m 1 in Blocks[0] with probability 1 − 1 2 κ .
leader-election mechanism Leader with the following properties: On input k from a majority of parties, Leader chooses a uniform leader ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n} and sends (k, ℓ) to all parties. This ensures that if less than half of all parties are corrupted, then at least one honest party must call Leader with input k before the adversary can learn the identity of ℓ. A leader-election mechanism tolerating any t < n/2 faults can be realized (in the synchronous model with a PKI) based on general assumptions [15] ; it can also be realized more efficiently using a threshold unique signature scheme. Below, we refer to a message Commit, k, B, Σ i as a correctly formed Commit message (from P i on (B, Σ)) if (B, Σ) is valid. We refer to a message (Notify, k, B, Σ, C) as a correctly formed Notify message on (B, Σ) if (B, Σ) is valid and C is a set of valid signatures on (Commit, k, B, Σ) from more than n/2 parties; in that case, C is called a k-certificate for (B, Σ). For an output ((B, Σ, C), g), we refer to g as the grade and (B, Σ, C) as the output. When a party's output is (B, Σ, C), we may also say that its output is a k-certificate for (B, Σ). Lemma 13. Assume fewer than n/2 parties are corrupted, and that the input of each honest party P i to Π k GC is a k i -vote on (B, Σ). If no honest party ever receives a k ′ -vote on (B ′ , Σ ′ ) = (B, Σ) with k ′ ≥ min i {k i } in step 1 of Π k GC , then (1) no honest party sends a Commit message on (B ′ , Σ ′ ) = (B, Σ) and (2) any honest party who outputs a nonzero grade outputs a k-certificate for (B, Σ).
Proof. By Lemma 11, every honest party outputs either (B, Σ) or ⊥ in every execution of Π Propose in step 1. It follows that no honest party P i sends a Commit message on (B ′ , Σ ′ ) = (B, Σ), proving the first part of the lemma. Since less than half the parties are corrupted, this means an honest party will receive fewer than ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ correctly formed Commit messages on anything other than (B, Σ); it follows that if an honest party outputs grade g = 2 then that party outputs (B, Σ, C) with C a k-certificate for (B, Σ).
Arguing similarly, no honest party will receive a correctly formed Notify message on anything other than (B, Σ). Hence any honest party that outputs grade 1 outputs (B, Σ, C) with C a kcertificate for (B, Σ). Proof. Say an honest party outputs (B, Σ, C) with a nonzero grade. That party must have received a correctly formed Notify message on (B, Σ). Since that Notify message includes a k-certificate C with signatures from more than half the parties, at least one honest party P must have sent a Commit message on (B, Σ). This means that P must have received (B, Σ) as its output from Π P ℓ Propose . By Lemma 10, this means the output of any other honest party from Π P ℓ Propose is either (B, Σ) or ⊥. The lemma follows. Proof. The leader ℓ chosen in step 2 was honest in step 1 with probability at least 1/2. We show that whenever this occurs, every honest party outputs grade 2. Agreement on a valid (B, Σ) follows from Lemma 15.
Assume ℓ was honest in step 1. Lemma 12 implies that every honest party holds the same valid (B ℓ , Σ ℓ ) =⊥ in step 2, and so sends a correctly formed Commit message on (B ℓ , Σ ℓ ). Since there are at least ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ honest parties, the lemma follows.
In Figure 6 we describe our block-agreement protocol Π ts BLA .
BLA
We describe the protocol from the point of view of a party P with input a valid pair (B, Σ). Lemma 17. If t < n/2, then Π ts BLA is t-secure.
Initialize
Proof. Assume fewer than n/2 parties are corrupted. Let k be the first iteration in which some honest party outputs (B, Σ). We first show that in every subsequent iteration: (1) every honest party P i uses as its input in step 1 a k i -vote on (B, Σ); and (2) corrupted parties cannot construct a k ′ -vote on (B ′ , Σ ′ ) = (B, Σ) for any k ′ ≥ min i {k i }.
Say an honest party outputs (B, Σ) in iteration k. Then that party must have output a kcertificate for (B, Σ) in the execution of Π k GC in iteration k. By Lemma 15, this means every honest party output a k-certificate on (B, Σ) in the same execution of Π k GC , and so (1) holds in iteration k + 1. Moreover, Lemma 14 implies that no honest party sent a Commit message on (B ′ , Σ ′ ) = (B, Σ) in the execution of Π k GC , and so (2) also holds in iteration k + 1. Lemma 13 implies, inductively, that the stated properties continue to hold in every subsequent iteration.
It follows from Lemma 13 that any other honest party P who generates output in Π ts BLA also outputs (B, Σ), regardless of whether they generate output in iteration k or a subsequent iteration.
Lemma 16 shows that in each iteration of Π ts BLA , with probability at least 1/2 all honest parties output some (the same) valid (B, Σ) in that iteration. Thus, after κ iterations all honest parties have generated valid output with probability at least 1 − 2 −κ (note that all parties terminate after κ iterations).
A.2 SMR Implies BA with Liveness
For completeness, we give a brief discussion of how SMR relates to BA in the setting of network agnostic protocols. In Figure 7 we show how to use an SMR protocol Π SMR as a blackbox subroutine to achieve a slightly weakened form of Byzantine agreement, which we call "BA with liveness." The key distinction between the BA definition given in Section 3 and the definition seen here is that the latter achieves liveness (not termination).
Definition 6 (Byzantine agreement with liveness). Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n , where each party P i begins holding input v i ∈ {0, 1}.
-Validity: Π is t-valid if the following holds whenever at most t of the parties are corrupted: if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v, then every honest party outputs v. If Π is t-valid, t-consistent, and t-live, then we say it is t-secure.
In the following, we once again use v i i as a shorthand for (i, m, σ), where σ i ← Sign(sk i , v i ).
Protocol Π BA
We describe the protocol from the point of view of a party Pi with input vi.
-Set Vi := ∅.
-Send vi i to every party. Denote as mj the message vj j received from party Pj. 
